政府风险投资与新创企业IPO价值：基于制度逻辑的理论解释

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 政府风险投资（governmental venture capitalist，GVC）对新创企业的影响受到了诸多学者的关注。然而，已有研究主要关注GVC对推动企业技术创新和成长的作用，较少从企业IPO表现角度关注GVC的作用，个别相关研究仅仅从GVC对公司治理影响的角度进行了分析，缺乏更加系统的研究视角和理论构建。本文基于制度逻辑理论视角，探究我国情境下GVC与新创企业IPO价值间的关系。本文认为与私有风险投资（private venture capitalist,PVC）的“专业服务逻辑”不同，GVC受“国家逻辑”驱动，强调投资的公共品属性及其对技术创新和产业的推动作用，而非投资回报，因此对IPO价值的影响会显著低于PVC。基于我国2000年至2016年获得VC投资并成功IPO上市的494家企业样本统计结果发现：相比于PVC，GVC对新创企业IPO价值的影响显著更小，且这一关系将随着机构进入时长的增加而增强、随着联合投资数量的上升而减弱。本文研究结论深化了GVC对新创企业成长作用的理论解释，并对GVC参与企业投资的实践开展提供了借鉴意义。

关键词: 政府风险投资, IPO价值, 制度逻辑, 联合投资

Abstract: The effect of governmental venture capitalist (GVC) investment in new ventures has attracted the attention of many scholars. However, most of the existing studies mainly focus on the role of GVC in promoting technological innovation of new ventures, or only analyze its impact on corporate governance, and seldom focus on the IPO performance, which lacks a more systematic theoretical perspective. From the perspective of institutional logics, this paper explores the impact of GVC investment on the IPO premium of new ventures in Chinese context. Different from PVC’s “professional service logic”, GVC is driven by “national logic”, emphasizing the public goods attributes of investment and its promotion of technological innovation or industry, rather than getting financial return, so it will have a negative impact on the IPO premium. Based on the data of 494 firms, this study shows that GVC has a negative effect on the IPO premium of startups. Furthermore, this negative effect of GVC on the IPO premium will be strengthened as the entry time of institutions increases, and it will be weakened as the number of joint investments increases. The paper not only deepens the theoretical explanation of GVC’s role in the growth of new ventures, but also provides a reference for the practice of GVC’s participation in corporate investment.

Key words: governmental venture capitalist, IPO premium, institutional logics, syndication

郝斌, 刘晓钰, 张诗韵. 政府风险投资与新创企业IPO价值：基于制度逻辑的理论解释[J]. 管理评论, 2023, 35(10): 94-104.

Hao Bin, Liu Xiaoyu, Zhang Shiyun. Governmental Venture Capitalists and IPO Premium of New Ventures——From an Institutional Logics Perspective[J]. Management Review, 2023, 35(10): 94-104.

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