信息观还是计量观：研发费用单列与自愿创新披露

管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (10): 81-93.

信息观还是计量观：研发费用单列与自愿创新披露

刘斌^1,2, 江承鑫¹

1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400030;
2. 重庆大学公司财务与会计治理创新研究院, 重庆 400030

收稿日期:2021-04-27 出版日期:2023-10-28 发布日期:2023-11-27
通讯作者: 江承鑫（通讯作者），重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士研究生。
作者简介:刘斌，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士，重庆大学公司财务与会计治理创新研究院常务副主任。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重点项目（18AGL009）；中央高校基本科研基地平台建设创新项目（2018CDJSK02PT09）。

Information Approach or Measurement Approach: Separately Listed R&D Expenses and Voluntary Innovation Disclosure

Liu Bin^1,2, Jiang Chengxin¹

1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030;
2. The Innovation Institute of Corporate Finance & Accounting Governance, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030

Received:2021-04-27 Online:2023-10-28 Published:2023-11-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 2018年开始实施的“研发费用单列”是会计理论信息观转向计量观在会计报表格式中的体现。本文分析了“研发费用单列”的理论意义，并以企业自愿创新披露为研究视角，提出“研发费用单列”的信息观假说和计量观假说。研究表明，研发费用单列后，研发强势企业与研发弱势企业在自愿创新披露上的差异减小了，支持了计量观假说。该结果通过了平行趋势检验、安慰剂检验等稳健性测试。对投资者反应的检验表明，研发费用单列后，与研发弱势企业相比，研发强势企业的市场反应变好了，进一步支持了计量观假说。横截面检验表明，计量观假说的效应在企业的信息披露质量较低、信息中介的信息传递作用较弱、投资者的识别信息能力较差时更强。

关键词: 信息观, 计量观, 研发费用单列, 自愿创新披露

Abstract: “Separately list R&D expenses” as required since 2018 reflects a shift in accounting theory from information approach to measurement approach. This paper analyzes the theoretical meaning of “separately list R&D expenses”, and puts forward information approach hypothesis and measurement approach hypothesis from the perspective of voluntary innovation disclosure. The results show that the difference in voluntary innovation disclosure between strong and weak R&D firms decreases after R&D expenses are listed separately, which supports the measurement hypothesis. The results pass the robust tests of parallel trend test, placebo test and so on. The results of investor response test show that, firms with strong R&D get a more positive market reaction, which further supports the measurement hypothesis. The cross-sectional tests show that the measurement hypothesis is stronger when the quality of information disclosure is low, the effect of information intermediary on information transmission is weak, and the ability of investors to identify information is poor.

Key words: information approach, measurement approach, separately list R&D expenses, voluntary innovation disclosure

刘斌, 江承鑫. 信息观还是计量观：研发费用单列与自愿创新披露[J]. 管理评论, 2023, 35(10): 81-93.

Liu Bin, Jiang Chengxin. Information Approach or Measurement Approach: Separately Listed R&D Expenses and Voluntary Innovation Disclosure[J]. Management Review, 2023, 35(10): 81-93.

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