An Evolution Game Analysis of the Opportunism Behaviors in Enterprise Cooperation and the Government Regulation under the Strategy of One Belt and One Road

Abstract

Abstract:

Under the strategy of "One Belt and One Road", the business cooperation is a complicated systematic project and the strategic choice of enterprises shows a clustering feature across the strategic ecosphere, where the stability of the cooperation between enterprises become an important factor that affects the whole strategic goal. An important feature that many projects have under the One Belt and One Road strategy is that both the cooperation with local civil/commercial subjects and the more involvement of local government are required. Existing researches focus on the overview and summary based on exploratory experience, lacking in-depth theoretical analysis that reveals enterprises' strategic choice in the process of cluster evolution of cooperation. Using evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the enterprise cooperation and opportunistic behavior in the process of government regulation. The research results show that under the condition of rational economic man hypothesis, enterprises and local governments will adopt opportunism behavior in the process of enterprise cooperation. The governments should set special regulatory bodies, which should adopt the strategy of dynamic support or penalties to promote the stable development of the regional economy.

Key words: One Belt and One Road, business cooperation, the government regulation, evolution game

Song Biao, Xu Shasha, Ding Qingyang. An Evolution Game Analysis of the Opportunism Behaviors in Enterprise Cooperation and the Government Regulation under the Strategy of One Belt and One Road[J]. , 2018, 30(1): 118-126.

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