Academic Independent Directors and the Performance of China's Listed POEs——“Supervision” and “Resource”

Abstract

Abstract:

In this paper, by applying two separate theories, i.e. Agency Cost Theory and Resource Dependent Theory, we empirically test the influence of hiring academic independent directors (AIDs) on the performance of China's listed private-owned enterprises (POEs). Results show that hiring AIDs can significantly raise POEs' performance, and both "supervision" and "resource" are viable explanations. Further study shows that AIDs' knowledge and expertise have a significant effect on their "supervising" ability, and that their advisory ability, intangible reputational resources and tangible social resources can positively improve the performance of POEs. However, our empirical results also show that AIDs with too many part-time jobs or holding administrative positions can effectively supervise the behavior of the company though they do bring significant resources to the POE. The contributions of this paper are as follows:not only does our study shed light on the mechanism of hiring AIDs on POE performance, but we also provide reference for both POEs and the government on AIDs selection and independent director regulations.

Key words: academic independent directors, performance of privately owned enterprises, supervision, resource

Li Li, Lv Chen, Yu Jiayi. Academic Independent Directors and the Performance of China's Listed POEs——“Supervision” and “Resource”[J]. , 2018, 30(1): 98-117.

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