›› 2015, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (8): 13-22.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

A Study of Individual Rule-identity and Strategy-expectation in the Transition of Governing the Commons——Based on the Survey of Residential Community Elevator Replacement in Nanjing

Guan Hongyu1, Zhu Xianchen1, Zhang Ping2, Liu Yujuan1   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094;
    2. China Center for Special Economic Zone Research, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060
  • Received:2014-07-18 Online:2015-08-30 Published:2015-09-02

Abstract:

As individuals live long enough in a specific policy regime, their preference and belief will change with the institution and regime correspondingly. During the transition, the change of the regime itself will cause individual cognitive adaptation crisis-preferences and beliefs fail to make the appropriate adjustments with institutional transformation. This paper focus on the feedback effect of specific regime and experience on preference and belief, especially, the effect of institution arrangement of government providing social service on the preference for public policy. Based on co-evolution of preference and institution perspective, this paper applies the individual preference-strategic expectation frame to understand the issues of common resources governance in residential community. The state and adjustment factors of rules-identity (preference) and strategy-expectation are investigated in the institutional transition of common resources governance by data acquisition and sample analysis in residential communities in Nanjing. The result shows that "vertical administrative power governing rules" is still the dominant rule-identity, while the new rule identity of "market level negotiation rule" is being learned and adjusted. In the adjustment process, individuals have low strategy-expectation on "solving by government", but the expectation on "solving by negotiation of property owners" is improved. Meanwhile, welfare care experience has effect on individuals rule identity and strategy-expectation. The individuals who experience a long time and wide range welfare regime and are cared by special administrative policy are more likely to have high rule identity of "government is responsive" while have low strategy-expectation on "solving by negotiation of property owners" in common resources governance in communities.

Key words: common pool resources, transition of governing the commons, rule identity (rule preference), strategy expectation