Design of Grid-connected Renewable Energy Mechanism under Asymmetric Information

Abstract

Abstract:

In the practice of renewable energy grid-connection, there is not only the problem of randomness in power generation output and electricity demand, but also the effect of information opacity of power grid cost on the subsidy policy. Based on the theory of revenue-sharing contract, this paper establishes a revenue-sharing contract under the scenario of asymmetric information by constructing the sha-ring coefficient as a function of the marginal cost of the grid and adjusting the partial transfer payment between the generator and the grid. A parameter variability analysis is then carried out regarding the randomness of power generation output and electricity demand as well as the marginal cost of the grid based on the theory of revealed incentive mechanism of power grid cost. Therefore, the supply chain equilib-rium through contract coordination is obtained.

Key words: renewable energy grid-connection, randomness, subsidy policy, revenue-sharing contract, revealed incentive mechanism

Kong Lingcheng, Tu Gaige, Zhang Yinghui. Design of Grid-connected Renewable Energy Mechanism under Asymmetric Information[J]. , 2018, 30(5): 249-261.

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