Game Mechanism Research Based on Enterprise Input of Pollution Control and Dynamic Consistency of Emissions Trading Policy

Abstract

Abstract:

In the paper, output of enterprises and pollution control level set by government are mainly analyzed based on Stackelberg game model under the background of emission trading market. And a governance model on the basis of controlling total emission can be constructed through the probability of illegal emission behavior punished by government and/or reported by the public. Moreover, this pa-per relocates economic benefit of enterprises and social environmental benefit of government and then comprehensively weighs the rela-tionship between pollution control input and environmental benefit. At last, results are illustrated. Firstly, credit of the government can improve the pollution control level of enterprises. Secondly, when government set a policy without tendency towards the average, the poli-cy has dynamic consistency. Thirdly, pollution control input decreases when price of emission trading, penalty or illegal emission or probability of government punishment or public reporting rise. All of the results can be regarded as a reference for the government to make policies.

Key words: emission right, Stackelberg game, pollution control input, policy dynamic consistency, environment profit and loss

Zhang Yannan, Sun Shaorong. Game Mechanism Research Based on Enterprise Input of Pollution Control and Dynamic Consistency of Emissions Trading Policy[J]. , 2018, 30(5): 239-248.

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