Abstract: This paper game-theoretically examines the strategic behaviors of manufacturers, P2P sharing platforms (referred to as platforms), and consumers with platforms conducting and not conducting self-operated B2P sharing business. Based on the corresponding equilibria, this paper finds that:the market conditions for platforms' expansion of self-operated B2P sharing business are that for any given level of service quality of B2P and P2P sharing business, and the fixed investment cost and product usage rate are low; (2) the platforms' expansion of self-operated B2P sharing business increases the manufacturer' s operating profit and total consumer surplus; (3) upgrading the service level of platform self-operated B2P sharing business has a positive impact on its expansion of self-operated business, while improving the service level of P2P sharing business has a non-monotonic impact on its expanding self-operated B2P sharing business; (4) when the platform expands its self-operated B2P sharing business, if the service quality of both the platform's selfoperated B2P and P2P sharing business is high, improving the service quality of self-operated B2P and/or P2P sharing business will result in a triple-wins for the platform, manufacturer and consumers;however, when the service quality of the P2P sharing business is low, only improving the service quality of the P2P sharing business will lead to a triple-losses situation for the platform, manufacturer, and consumers.

Key words: P2P sharing platform, manufacturer, self-operated B2P sharing business, service quality