Abstract: Data transaction infrastructure, such as blockchain and privacy computing technology, can enable data transactions to realize “data availability and invisibility”, which is conducive to solving the paradox of data transaction and data security, but data suppliers and data transaction platforms are not motivated to build new infrastructure due to the lack of effective incentives. In order to explore the strategic choices of all parties in the process of data transaction infrastructure construction, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model of data suppliers, data transaction platforms and the government, and analyzes how the government should apply regulatory measures to promote the data infrastructure. The results show that: (1) the government should focus on the regulation of data transaction platforms and timely provide subsidies in the early stage of the data infrastructure construction, which is conducive for the system to reach the desired stability point faster; (2) the government should take measures to reduce the cost of the data infrastructure, otherwise it will be difficult for the data transaction market to achieve the independent operation; (3) the government should strengthen the regulation in the early stage of the operation of the data transaction market by establishing a comprehensive data trading rules and systems, and gradually loosen regulation after the early stage. This will help establish market trust and attract more market participants. This paper analyzes the mechanism of tripartite synergy among data suppliers, data transaction platforms and the government, and thus provides theoretical basis and policy support for accelerating the construction and improvement of the data trading market.

Key words: data transaction infrastructure, cooperative mechanism, evolutionary game, data transaction