Talent Incentive, Enterprise Innovation Performance and Distortion of Innovation Structure—Evidence from China’ Talent Introduction Policy

Abstract

Abstract: Talent represents a crucial resource for both economic and social progress. In order to overcome the existing ideological and institutional barriers that impede talent development, the Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Institutional Mechanism for Talent Development was issued in 2016 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC). This directive mandates the active implementation of institutional reforms by governments at all levels, with the aim of promoting talent development and enhancing efficiency in talent-related initiatives. This study employs a PSM-DID model, leveraging temporal discrepancies in the release of talent introduction policies across various Chinese cities. A sample of A-share listed companies is utilized to investigate whether China’s ongoing reform of the talent institutional mechanism contributes to optimizing the allocation of talent resources within cities and enhancing corporate innovation performance. The findings reveal that the implementation of urban talent introduction policies significantly contributes to the innovation performance of local firms. However, it also leads to distortions in the innovation structure. Specifically, the improvement in innovation performance is primarily driven by non-invention patents, while the impact on invention-based innovation is not significant. Mechanism tests suggest that the nested monetary-type talent solicitation measures, talent subsidy incentives, and intense competition for talents within firms are important factors contributing to the distorted innovation structure. Furthermore, heterogeneity analysis reveals that the effect of talent incentives on firms’ innovation performance and innovation structure is more pronounced in the western region, non-high-tech industries, and non-state-owned enterprises. This study provides deeper insights into the influence of talent introduction policies on firm-level innovation and innovation structure, thereby offering significant theoretical and practical implications for the advancement of China’s talent market-oriented reform and innovation-driven development strategy.

Key words: talent introduction policy, corporate innovation, innovation structure, material incentives

Hu Jun, Ren Yangqiu. Talent Incentive, Enterprise Innovation Performance and Distortion of Innovation Structure—Evidence from China’ Talent Introduction Policy[J]. Management Review, 2024, 36(4): 100-114.

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