Abstract: Rookie independent directors (RIDs) refer to those who serve as independent directors for the first time and lack experience in the board of directors. Will they lead to ineffective supervision due to their lack of independence and experience or lead to more effective supervision because they are motivated to build personal reputation and more independent? This paper explores the above questions from the perspective of stock price crash risk which has a significant impact on the capital market and investors and can comprehensively reflect the supervision effect of the RID. Research findings:RIDs increase the risk of stock price crash. Further analysis shows that when RIDs have industry expertise, a not very busy schedule, an academic background, overseas experience and exposure to a strict legal environment, their positive impact on the stock price crash risk is weakened. The mechanism test shows that poor performance of RID (as evidenced by their lack of dissenting voices or resulting in lower quality of corporate information disclosure), which is the path through which RIDs influence the risk of stock price crash. On the one hand, this study enriches the literature on the RIDs and stock price crash risk. On the other hand, it has enlightening significance for deeply understanding the governance behavior and effect of RIDs, improving the mechanism of selecting and hiring independent directors, and promoting the steady and healthy development of capital market.

Key words: rookie independent director, stock price crash risk, dissenting behavior of independent directors, characteristics of independent directors, readability of annual reports