Abstract: This paper explores the information sharing and financing strategies in an information-asymmetric dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one capital-constrained retailer. Based on whether the players share demand information and whether the capital-constrained retailer chooses trade credit financing or bank financing, we use the Stackelberg game to establish four different profit models. We derive the corresponding optimal order quantities and profits under different scenarios, and explore the equilibrium strategies for the dual-channel supply chain. We find that when the information subsidy cost is in a certain range, the players of the dual-channel supply chain will share the information, and the upper and lower boundaries of the range are related to the retailer's financing choice. Moreover, when the accuracy of the retailer's demand information is moderate, sharing information can alleviate the retailer's capital constraint problem. In addition, when the expectation of the market demand is low, the retailer should actively share the information with the manufacturer in order to make the manufacturer reduce the direct channel's order quantity. Furthermore, the increase of channel competition intensity may promote the players to share demand information in the dual-channel supply chain.

Key words: dual-channel supply chain, capital-constrained retailer, information sharing, financing choice, equilibrium strategies