Abstract: The paper constructs a theoretical model of green fiscal and tax policies, and simulates the existence of trap of environmental protection tax system and “ironing mechanism” of green fiscal policy. The research finds that in the absence of supporting policies, there are obvious tax traps when the environmental tax is too high or too low. The environmental protection tax policy under the guidance of single subsidy policy is still faced with the limitation of environmental protection tax rate. Furthermore, the environmental protection tax policies oriented by the green R&D subsidies, producer green price subsidies and consumer green price subsidies are exposed respectively to “growth trap”, “pollution trap” and “growth trap” under the circumstance of the low environmental protection tax rate. However, in the green fiscal expenditure portfolio consisting of producers green price subsidies and green R&D subsidies, when the proportion of producers green price subsidies is between 20% and 40%, the environmental protection tax policy will coordinate the development of economic growth and environmental governance to the largest extent. Therefore, the green fiscal policy has an obvious “ironing” effect on the trap of environmental protection tax system. The proper allocation of green fiscal and tax policies is crucial to the design of China’s environmental governance policies.

Key words: environmental tax, green finance, growth trap, pollution trap, ironing mechanism