Abstract: Aiming at the green innovation path of highly patent-intensive manufacturing that existing researches neglect, we construct an evolutionary game model of green innovation path selection for highly patent-intensive manufacturing enterprises exposed to changing intensity of government protection of intellectual property protection based on the heterogeneity of enterprises, the difference of capital investment in different innovation paths and the substitutability of enterprise products, and conduct a stability analysis and numerical simulation analysis on the evolution strategies and evolution paths, so as to promote green innovation of China’ s manufacturing enterprises. The results show that enterprises will make reasonable choices of green innovation path based on government regulations to gain a competitive advantage. The intensity of intellectual property protection has a significant impact on enterprises’ choice of green innovation paths. With the increase in the intensity of intellectual property protection, more enterprises begin to choose independent green innovation paths. When the minimum net benefits brought by independent green innovation to enterprises becomes positive, enterprises will all pursue independent green innovation and this is an desired ideal state. Enterprises with different innovation capabilities may act differently in choosing innovation path. Specifically, enterprises with innovative advantages have a stronger intention to choose independent green innovation and evolve faster, while enterprises with innovative disadvantages have a faster evolution to green innovation imitation.

Key words: intensity of intellectual property protection, evolutionary game, independent green innovation, green innovation imitation