Management Review

›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2): 165-173.

• Technology and Innovation Management • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Research on Cooperation Strategy between Enterprises and R&D Institutions with Dynamic Game Method

Wang Xuna1, Sheng Yongxiang2, Tan Qingmei1, Wu Jie2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212003
  • Received:2017-05-03 Online:2020-02-29 Published:2020-03-07

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Abstract:

In the cooperation of an enterprises and a R&D institution, the two parties' effort level and the benefit from their cooperation will be affected by their willingness to maintain a long relationship. This paper constructs a cooperative strategy model between an enterprise and a R&D institution from the perspective of dynamic game to analyze the internal logical relationship between the strategy choice of different cooperation schemes and the incentive of enterprises and then analyze the profit trend and strategy choice of the two parties under different incentive through numerical simulation. The results show that when both parties consider follow-on cooperation, they will benefit the most from the current cooperation; there is a reasonable range of incentives, in which both parties are willing to consider follow-on cooperation; cost subsidy for R&D institutions has an effect on the optimal incentive for continuous cooperation between the two sides. When the cost subsidy decreases, the optimal incentive increases; when the cost subsidy increases, the optimal incentive decreases.

Key words: enterprises, R&D institutions, cooperation, incentive