Abstract: In this paper, an evolutionary game model between safety investment by the company and safety supervision by the local government is built. In the model, the impact of safety investment by the company on production profit is considered. Also, the interest relationship between the company and local government is modeled through considering tax ratio. The evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is given and the impact of government regulation parameters, including safety investment reward, penalty, mandatory safety investment cost and tax ratio on the evolutionary stable strategy, is analyzed. The impact of the parameters indicates that safety investment reward does not affect the evolutionary stable strategy and the penalty can impel the company to invest in safety measures when the accident loss is relatively low. The increase of mandatory safety investment cost can decrease the company's safety investment probability and also the government's safety supervision probability. The stronger the interest relationship between local government and the company is, the higher the probability that the company invests in safety measures and the lower the accident probability. The results of this paper can help reduce accident probability and improve safety management level through guiding the government to set safety supervision related parameters.

Key words: safety investment, safety supervision, evolutionary game, limited resources, benefit dependency