›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (6): 225-237.

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Joint Pricing and Inventory Control Policies of Extended Warranty and Products under the Influence of Product Quality

Kou Jun1,2, Zhao Zehong3   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044;
    2. College of Economics and Management, Chongqing University of Post and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065;
    3. School of Public Affairs, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030
  • Received:2016-11-25 Online:2019-06-28 Published:2019-07-08

Abstract:

Aiming at the multiple effects of product quality, a two-period Stackelberg dynamic game model is developed, which is based on the scenario that products are provided by a manufacturer and sold by a strong retailer who provides extended warranty. We analyze the influence of the quality sensitivities on the optimal decisions of product quality, price and inventories. We comparatively analyze the optimal decisions under centralized and decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we design a "quality cost sharing" contract to remedy the loss of profit which is caused by the improvement of quality and motivate the manufacturer. The conclusions show that the strong retailer could encourage the manufacturer to improve the quality of the products and take the initiative to share the quality cost. The retailer could influence the wholesale price decision by carrying strategic inventories across two periods, and then affect the retail price. The "quality cost sharing" contract could improve the marketing effect of vertical marketing system. Finally, a numerical simulation is used to verify the effectiveness of the coordination contract.

Key words: product quality, extended warranty, strategic inventories, joint pricing, coordination strategy