Research on the Risk Management of Local Government Financing Platform Based on the Perspective of Stakeholders

Abstract

Abstract:

By constructing an entropy weight-positive and negative ideal evaluation price model and using the five-level classification method to assess the risk of selected 9 representative local government financing platform companies, it is found that the overall risk of the local government financing platform is controllable, but some of the risks are high. Based on the theory of stakeholders, this paper explores the causes and conduction paths of the risk of local government financing platform. In order to maximize the overall interests of the local government financing platform, the central government's leadership and coordination as well as all relevant stakeholders' cooperation are required to ultimately achieve effective control over the risks of the local government financing platform.

Key words: local government financing platform, stakeholders, risk, entropy weights-positive and negative ideal evaluation price model

Zhang Jiemei, Wang Yupei, Zhang Yuping. Research on the Risk Management of Local Government Financing Platform Based on the Perspective of Stakeholders[J]. , 2019, 31(3): 61-70.

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