How does Local Governments Respond to the Requirements for Promoting the Scientific and Technological Innovation Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative?——A Comparative Case Study

Abstract

Abstract:

This paper explores the local government response in the process of gradual change of central policy requirements through a case study. By means of a "situation-actor-means-ends" analytical framework, we compare the local practices of Shanghai, Shaanxi and Xi'an in promoting the scientific and technological innovation cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative. The study finds that with the central policy requirements change gradually, local decision-makers make dynamic and non-homogeneous responses according to the situation change under the influence of the "loss aversion" preference, and they engage in different responses via contingent combination of various actor, means and ends. In contrast with previous literature, this study proposes a systematic framework to analyze local government response. It reveals the causes of diverse local government responses, and helps to further understand the "black box" of local government decision-making within the reform.

Key words: local government response, the Belt and Road Initiative, inter-government relationship, government decision, accountability pressure

Yan Bo, Cheng Qijiazhi, Yang Zesen, Wu Long. How does Local Governments Respond to the Requirements for Promoting the Scientific and Technological Innovation Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative?——A Comparative Case Study[J]. , 2019, 31(2): 278-290.

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