Public Governance, Incentive Structure and Sustainable Development of Special Economic Zone: A Case Study Based on SEM

Abstract

Abstract:

This paper constructs a SEM model using questionnaire survey from Binxi Development Zone to study how incentive structure grows out of public governance influences the sustainable development of special economic zone. It shows that industrial upgrading, incentive land-use, and environmental protection are most important incentives. If governments could help embed enterprises into locally cultural and social networks, effects of public governance would be amplified significantly. On the contrary, if governments pay too much attention to economic benefit from investment, effects of public governance would not last long. The physical border special economic zone should vanish after resources' absorption in the earlier age. Governments should focus on efficiency of resource utilization and encouraging enterprises to protect environment and integrate with local community by transforming governance.

Key words: public governance, incentive structure, special economic zone, sustainable development, SEM

Hong Tao, Sun Yuze, Mei Ping. Public Governance, Incentive Structure and Sustainable Development of Special Economic Zone: A Case Study Based on SEM[J]. , 2019, 31(2): 252-263.

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