Decision Rights Allocation of Pluralistic Shareholders: Behavior Logic and Path Analysis——A Case Study of Vanke Co.,Ltd

Abstract

Abstract:

Decision rights allocation of pluralistic shareholders has aroused considerable attention in academic researching and business practice. Decentralized and diversified ownership structure leads to the appearance of pluralistic participators incorporate governance. With different identities and preferences, pluralistic participators break the linear decision frames of ‘Shareholders-Boards-Management’ and form decision networks linked by economic and social relationships. Through the case study of Vanke control conflict under "ownership-networks" mechanisms, it is found that ownership and network power serve as the foundation of decision rights in pluralistic participators decisions. According to the different level of ownership and network power, we summarize 4 patterns of decision rights allocation. Corresponding to that 4 patterns of decision rights allocation, pluralistic shareholders may play 4 different roles in decision-making process and follow different behavioral logics. Based on the decision power contest and decision power transaction model, we analyze the behaviors of pluralistic shareholders within the decision rights allocation model. Then, we can find paths of decisions participation and power acquisition. Except that, our conclusion also shows that decision rights separate from ownership and get more diversified under the circumstance of decentralization of ownership structure; Networks power becomes an important dimension of decision rights. So the networks centrality becomes more important for pluralistic shareholders. It is necessary to subdivide the decision rights and allocate properly to different pluralistic shareholders, then we can integrate their preferences in scientific decision making.

Key words: pluralistic shareholders decision, decision rights allocation, shareholders decision network, network power

Ma Lianfu, Du Bo. Decision Rights Allocation of Pluralistic Shareholders: Behavior Logic and Path Analysis——A Case Study of Vanke Co.,Ltd[J]. , 2019, 31(10): 273-289.

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