›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (10): 191-199.

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Study of Government Regulation and Corporate Labor Dispatch Behavior on the Basis of Evolutionary Game Theory

Li Guangping   

  1. School of Management, Henan University of Technology, Zhengzhou 450001
  • Received:2018-12-08 Online:2019-10-28 Published:2019-11-05

Abstract:

In view of the enterprise labor dispatch behavior and through the evolutionary game model about government and enterprises, this paper analyzes the evolution pattern of government regulation and corporate labor dispatch behavior on the basis of evolutionary game theory. As shown in the study, there is no evolution stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary game of the government and enterprises labor dispatching, and instead, it is a dynamic process of evolution. In this process, the government regulation mainly depends on regulation costs, returns and the negative effect caused by the omission of the relevant regulations, while the enterprises labor dispatching is affected by government regulation, supervision of the public and the labors' attention for their employer and brand, etc. Finally we provide some specific suggestions for building a more equitable, efficient labor dispatching market.

Key words: government regulation, labor dispatch, evolutionary game theory