Incentive and Supervisory Contract between Banks and 3PLs in Supply Chain Finance of Agricultural Product

Abstract

Abstract:

Agricultural products financing, as one of important operational modes, is more reliant on Third-Party Logistics (3PLs) since agricultural products are perishable, seasonal, dispersive and not easily transportable and storable. The effort of 3PLs bears heavily on the security and stability of agricultural products and also on value creation and core enterprises' profit. Therefore, applying principal-agent theory, this paper studies the contract between banks and 3PLs under the situation of core enterprises participating in the design of contract from two aspects:assistance participation and cooperation participation. The results show that with core enterprises' participation, there is no change in the level of 3PL's effort, but banks' profits increase. If 3PLs are supervised in such a manner as to ensure they are inspired, they will put in more effort. The research also indicates that, compared with cooperation participation, assistance participation is better for banks' profits. The conclusions suggest that banks should try to make core enterprises join, and to adopt assistance participation.

Key words: supply chain finance, agricultural products financing, incentive mechanism, supervision mechanism

Xu Peng, Fu Hongyong, Wang Lei, Peng Xuanhua. Incentive and Supervisory Contract between Banks and 3PLs in Supply Chain Finance of Agricultural Product[J]. , 2018, 30(10): 26-39.

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