Demand Signal Sharing in Competitive Dual Channels

Abstract

Abstract:

This paper applies the game theory with incomplete information to explore the value of the signal data about demand and the information sharing issue in competitive dual channels. The research shows that the manufacturer's appropriate pricing for the signal data can induce the retailers to purchase such data and help the retailers to choose more reasonable retailing prices. Compared with the case without information sharing of signal, the manufacturer and the retailers can earn more profits from such information sharing, and the expected profits of the manufacturer and the retailers resulting from the information all increase in the accuracy of the signal. The increase of the competing intensity between the retailers will benefit the manfuacturer, and hurt the retailers themselves.

Key words: information sharing, signal, dual channels, competition

Mao Xiaobing. Demand Signal Sharing in Competitive Dual Channels[J]. , 2018, 30(1): 202-209.

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