Economic Compensation or Police Deployment: Optimization Model of Emergency

Abstract

Abstract:

Environmental pollution mass event challenges Chinese strategies of innovational social governance and safeguard security. According to the two emergency management strategies of economic compensation and police deployment, the paper builds an optimization model of emergency management, and compares three scenarios that are economic compensation, police proper deployment and police improper deployment. The paper provides the optimization solutions for each case separately. Lastly, the paper discusses in detail the problem by numerical analysis. The results show that the advantage of economic compensation is low risk, but it can cause the serious reputation effect. The solution based only on economic compensation without resorting to governance by law goes against the long-term social stability. The advantage of police deployment is low economic cost, but it should face the larger social unstable risk. Thus, local governments need to balance the two emergency strategies according to the specific scenario.

Key words: environmental pollution mass event, optimization model, economic compensation, police deployment, emergency management

Shen Yan, Zou Huawei, Liu Dehai, Li Shiming. Economic Compensation or Police Deployment: Optimization Model of Emergency[J]. , 2016, 28(8): 51-58.

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