Research on Social Trust Repair Strategy of Animal Epidemic Public Crisis from the Perspective of Multi-game

Abstract

Abstract:

This paper draws upon the "Huangpu River's Float Pig Events" in Zhejiang and Shanghai and uses data from five investigations as sample to explore the problem of social credibility in public crisis in terms of major animal epidemic. The result shows that, on the premise of limited rationality, the government, producers and consumers tripartite game theory play an important role in social trust in public crisis in terms of major animal epidemic. The research finds that:the government, producers and consumers' behavior influence each other, and the government plays a pivotal and guiding role in public crisis events of major animal epidemic, however, customers stay in a subordinate position and they are heavily dependent on government's information to make decisions. This paper proposes a multi-party participation in crisis management and crisis conflict coordination mechanism to avoid social panic and the imbalance of market supply and demand which are caused by social incredibility.

Key words: public crisis, multi-player game, social trust, repairing strategies

Li Yanling, Su Qingsong, Wang Jun. Research on Social Trust Repair Strategy of Animal Epidemic Public Crisis from the Perspective of Multi-game[J]. , 2016, 28(8): 250-259.

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