Strategic Belief Interaction and Industrial Competition

Abstract

Abstract:

In the background of current complex industrial competition in China, the intra- and inter-national complex relations have a strong influence on the beliefs in the industrial competition. This paper introduces the concept of belief, methods to compare beliefs and mechanisms in which beliefs are influenced. The model in this paper analyzes the belief-influential firm who strategically reveals belief to maximize its own expected payoff. It is proved that this belief-influential firm can profit from strategic belief revelation. This model is valuable for the best strategy formation in the industrial competition, industrial regulatory policy making, and adjustment of the industrial policy in the context of current complex economic competition. Specifically this model has important economic implication for the competition in the complex international environment.

Key words: asymmetric beliefs, industrial competition, game theory, auctions

Qiao Heng. Strategic Belief Interaction and Industrial Competition[J]. , 2016, 28(7): 31-41.

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