›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (1): 73-82.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

The Influence of Negative Media Coverage on Tunneling of Controlling Shareholder: Evidence from China

Li Ming, Ye Yong   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031
  • Received:2013-10-31 Online:2016-01-30 Published:2016-02-01

Abstract:

As an important external corporate governance mechanism, negative media coverage has great impacts on restraining controlling stakeholder's behavior and protecting the interest of investors. Under the Chinese especial institutional background, we empirically test the impacts of negative media coverage on controlling shareholder's tunneling behavior, with the sample of 2010-2012 non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The empirical results demonstrate that negative media coverage can reduce controlling shareholder's tunneling behavior, and compared with state-owned listed companies, non-state owned listed companies are more likely to reduce the controlling shareholder's tunneling behavior when there's negative media coverage. The research results are not only conducive for a deeper understanding of media's role in corporate governance, but also helpful in promoting the perfection of corporate governance and protecting the interest of investors.

Key words: negative media coverage, controlling stakeholder, tunneling, investor protection