管理评论 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (7): 128-141.

• 创新与创业管理 • 上一篇    

考虑两类投入模式的企业基础研究激励机制分析

荣俊美1, 陈强1, 贾婷1,2   

  1. 1. 同济大学经济与管理学院, 上海 200092;
    2. 大理大学经济与管理学院, 大理 671003
  • 收稿日期:2022-01-04 发布日期:2024-08-03
  • 作者简介:荣俊美,同济大学经济与管理学院博士研究生;陈强(通讯作者),同济大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;贾婷,大理大学经济与管理学院讲师,同济大学经济与管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重大项目(21ZDA018)。

An Analysis of How to Incentivize Enterprises under Two Input Models to Involve in Basic Research

Rong Junmei1, Chen Qiang1, Jia Ting1,2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Dali University, Dali 671003
  • Received:2022-01-04 Published:2024-08-03

摘要: 开放式创新生态系统建设下,政府既要激励企业基础研究投入,也要提高企业科研成果开放比例,从而扩大知识溢出带来的社会收益;科技领军企业既要投入基础研究以抢占未来科技前沿,也要进行市场化发展以维持企业运营。基于委托-代理理论,考虑科技领军企业直接参与基础研究、出资委托高校或科研院所进行基础研究两种投入模式,构建“政-企”“企-学”与“政-企与学”之间的委托-代理模型,探究政府税收优惠、资金投入、产权协调等激励机制的优化设计,对比不同研发模式的激励机制与效率,并利用Matlab R2020a进行数值仿真分析。研究表明:(1)相同的政府激励机制,对企业不同基础研究投入模式的激励效果不同;(2)政府对不同企业基础研究投入模式应制定差异化的固定资金支持与开放度,尤其应加强企业对高校、科研院所的创新成果产权激励;(3)利润率较低的企业参与基础研究的努力水平和投入规模更高,利润率较高的企业应在企业产权比重高的政策下选择委托科研模式;(4)企业基础研究投入规模带来的社会声誉价值对不同模式的投入规模和基础研究努力水平均具有提升作用,获得收益的周期越长,对开放式创新生态建设、委托科研模式的成功率均不利。最后,结合我国现状,为完善基础研究投入激励机制提出相关对策,为企业基础研究投入战略提出相关建议。

关键词: 开放式创新生态, 企业基础研究投入, 委托-代理, 激励机制, 数值分析

Abstract: Under the construction of an open innovation ecosystem, the government must encourage enterprises to involve in basic research on the one hand and open up more of their scientific research results on the other, so as to amplify the social benefits of knowledge spillovers. Leading technology companies must not only involve in basic research to seize the forefront of future science and technology, but also carry out market-oriented development to maintain business operations. Given that enterprises can involve in basic research in two models: directly on their own or on a consignment basis with universities or scientific research institutions as the consignee, this paper uses the principal-agent theory to build a principal-agent model respectively between government and enterprise, between enterprise and academia and between government and enterprise/academia. Then this paper explores how to design an optimized incentive mechanism through government tax incentives, capital investment and property rights coordination, compares the incentive mechanism and efficiency under different models, and makes a numerical simulation analysis by use of Matlab R2020a. The research shows that: 1) the same government incentive mechanism has different incentive effects on enterprises’ involvement in basic research, depending on their input model; 2) the government should provide differentiated fixed funding support and differentiated degree of openness of property rights for enterprises according to the model of their input into basic research, and especially for the enterprises that adopt the consignment model, the government should guide them to provide property right incentives to the universities or scientific research institutions that achieve innovations; 3) companies with low profit margins can input a high level of effort and resources in basic research, and companies with high profit margins should adopt the consignment model for scientific research under the policy of a high proportion of corporate property rights; 4) the social reputation value brought by the scale of corporate input into basic research has a boosting effect on the scale of input in different models and the level of basic research effort. The longer time it takes to gain return, the less likely to successfully build an open innovation ecosystem and put the consignment model into practice. Finally, in combination with China’s current situation, relevant countermeasures for improving the basic research input incentive mechanism and relevant suggestions for corporate strategies of input into basic research are put forward.

Key words: open innovation ecosystem, corporate input into basic research, principal-agent, incentive mechanism, numerical analysis