管理评论 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (11): 218-226,247.

• 会计与财务管理 • 上一篇    

注册制下的信息披露、退市机制与市场运行——基于计算实验视角

崔毅安1, 杨宗杭1, 韦立坚2, 熊熊3,4   

  1. 1. 深圳证券交易所研究所, 深圳 518038;
    2. 中山大学管理学院, 广州 510275;
    3. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072;
    4. 天津大学复杂管理系统实验室, 天津 300072
  • 收稿日期:2023-03-20 发布日期:2024-12-09
  • 作者简介:崔毅安,深圳证券交易所研究所副研究员,博士;杨宗杭,深圳证券交易所研究所执行经理,博士;韦立坚,中山大学管理学院副教授,博士生导师,博士;熊熊(通讯作者),天津大学管理与经济学部教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72001149;72141304;72171239);科技部重大专项课题(2022YFC3303304);广东省重点领域研发计划“区块链与金融科技”重点专项(2020B010110004);广东省自然科学基金杰出青年项目(2021B1515020073)。

Information Disclosure, Delisting Mechanism and Market Operation under the Registration-based IPO System—From the Perspective of Agent-based Modeling

Cui Yian1, Yang Zonghang1, Wei Lijian2, Xiong Xiong3,4   

  1. 1. Research Institute, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Shenzhen 518038;
    2. School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275;
    3. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072;
    4. Laboratory of Computation and Analytics of Complex Management Systems (CACMS), Tianjin 300072
  • Received:2023-03-20 Published:2024-12-09

摘要: 注册制是全面深化资本市场改革的“牛鼻子”工程,本文以注册制改革中两大核心要素——信息披露和退市机制为抓手,旨在分析与防范注册制改革中的微观机制及其风险。通过构建人工股票市场,对潜在风险及其演进过程进行模拟,研究发现:个人与机构投资者信息获取处理能力不同,可能增加市场信息不对称;壳价值消失与退市机制打通可能增加市场短时波动;信息披露和退市机制协同叠加可以改善市场运行质量。在此基础上,提出建议:构建以投资者需求为导向的差异化信息披露体系;防范壳价值消失和退市机制打通可能带来的市场短时波动加剧;基于系统观念寻求注册制市场机制设计的协同方案。本文对于政策制定者进行有效的注册制市场监管和机制设计具有重要参考价值。

关键词: 注册制, 信息披露, 退市机制, 风险防范, 计算实验

Abstract: The registration-based IPO system is the flagship project in the comprehensive reform of the China’s capital market. This paper focuses on two core elements of this reform: information disclosure and delisting mechanisms, aiming to analyze and prevent the micro-mechanisms and risks. By constructing an artificial stock market and simulating potential risks and their evolution, the study finds that: first, the different information processing capabilities of individual and institutional investors may increase market information asymmetry; second, the disappearance of shell value and implementation of delisting mechanisms may lead to short-term market volatility; third, the reasonable combination of information disclosure and delisting mechanisms may enhance market operation quality. Our recommendations: first, build a differentiated information disclosure system guided by investor demand; second, prevent increased market volatility due to the disappearance of shell value and implementation of delisting mechanisms; third, seek synergistic solutions for the market mechanism design of the registration-based IPO system from a system perspective. The paper provides valuable insights for policymakers in effective market regulation and mechanism design.

Key words: registration-based IPO system, information disclosure, delisting mechanism, risk prevention, agent-based modeling