并购对赌协议与并购方预期管理行为

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文研究并购对赌协议的设置对协议期内并购方预期管理行为的影响及作用机制。现有关于并购对赌协议研究中，大多聚焦对被并购公司（被约束方）的影响，而本文关注并购对赌协议对并购方（受保护方）的影响。研究发现：在业绩对赌协议期间，并购方业绩达到（超过）分析师一致性盈余预测的概率显著提升，这可能是因为并购方在并购对赌协议期间进行了向下的业绩预期管理。在业绩预告前，分析师一致性盈余预测与上市公司是否参与了业绩对赌没有显著关联；而业绩预告后，参与了业绩对赌的上市公司的分析师一致性盈余预测显著下降。在并购对赌协议期间，并购方达到（超过）资本市场预期会引起更强烈的市场反应，这可以解释预期管理的动机。同时，在公司治理制度能够对上市公司管理者有效约束的企业中，这一现象会显著减弱。最后，上市公司也倾向于在并购对赌协议期间进行盈余管理操作，但是盈余管理的幅度较为有限，并不会对上市公司的业绩是否能够达成投资者预期造成显著影响。总而言之，本文发现并购对赌协议的设置对并购方产生了“溢出效应”，作为并购方的上市公司，通过预期管理损害了投资者的利益。这一发现在理论上弥补了现有并购对赌协议和业绩超预期研究的不足，对如何进行资本市场投资者保护制度建设同样具有重要启示意义。

关键词: 并购对赌协议, 资本市场预期, 预期管理

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of valuation adjustment mechanism (VAM) on acquirer’s performance meeting or beating market expectation during the period of VAM as well as the mechanism underlying the impact. Unlike most of the existing VAM researches that focus on acquirees (constrained parties), this paper examines the impact of VAM on the performance of acquirers (protected parties). The research reveals a significant increase in the probability of acquirer meeting or surpassing analyst consensus earnings forecasts during the period of VAM. This may be attributed to the active management of performance expectations downward by acquirer during the period of VAM. Further analysis indicates that, prior to performance forecasts, there is no significant correlation between analyst consensus earnings forecasts and whether listed companies are involved in VAM. However, after performance forecasts, listed companies engaged in VAM experience a significant decline in analyst consensus earnings forecasts. During the period of VAM, acquirer’s meeting or beating market expectations triggers a more pronounced market reaction, providing insights into the motivations behind expectation management. Additionally, it is observed that this phenomenon is significantly attenuated in companies where corporate governance mechanisms effectively constrain managers. Lastly, the study finds that listed companies also tend to engage in earnings management operations during the period of VAM, but the extent of earnings management is limited and does not significantly impact whether their performance meets investor expectations. In conclusion, this study identifies a “spillover effect” of VAM on acquirers, where listed companies, as acquirers, compromise investor interests through expectation management. This finding theoretically addresses gaps in the existing research on VAM and expectation management, offering crucial insights for the development of effective investor protection systems in capital markets.

Key words: valuation adjustment mechanism of M&A, expectation of capital market, expectation management

杨圣之, 陈钦源, 王皓. 并购对赌协议与并购方预期管理行为[J]. 管理评论, 2024, 36(11): 206-217.

Yang Shengzhi, Chen Qinyuan, Wang Hao. Valuation Adjustment Mechanism of M&A and Acquirer's Expectation Management[J]. Management Review, 2024, 36(11): 206-217.

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