管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (9): 287-299.

• 公共管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

通报负面典型案例能以儆效尤吗?

张国兴1, 林伟纯1,2, Bin Su3, 高杨1, 陈张蕾1   

  1. 1. 兰州大学管理学院, 兰州 730000;
    2. 三峡大学法学与公共管理学院, 宜昌 443002;
    3. 新加坡国立大学能源研究所, 新加坡 118620
  • 收稿日期:2022-12-19 出版日期:2023-09-28 发布日期:2023-10-31
  • 通讯作者: 林伟纯(通讯作者),兰州大学管理学院,博士,三峡大学法学与公共管理学院讲师。
  • 作者简介:张国兴,兰州大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;Bin Su,新加坡国立大学能源研究所教授,博士生导师,博士;高杨,兰州大学管理学院博士研究生;陈张蕾,兰州大学管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重点项目(21AZD112)。

Can Notification of Negative Typical Cases Be a Way of Warning?

Zhang Guoxing1, Lin Weichun1,2, Bin Su3, Gao Yang1, Chen Zhanglei1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou 730000;
    2. School of Law and Public Administration, China Three Gorges University, Yichang 443002;
    3. Energy Studies Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore 118620
  • Received:2022-12-19 Online:2023-09-28 Published:2023-10-31

摘要: 中央生态环境保护督察是解决环境治理困境的重大制度创新,通报负面典型案例是其重要举措。本文在厘清通报负面典型案例如何产生震慑效应的基础上,利用2014—2020年282个地级市的面板数据,对通报负面典型案例的震慑效应及震慑效应的影响因素进行量化评估。研究结果表明:通报负面典型案例对地方政府产生了震慑效应;通报中的严厉措辞强化了震慑效应;点名市党委及市政府强化了震慑效应;较高程度的公众参与和政府回应放大了震慑效应;震慑效应对于较容易治理的环境问题效果较好,但对于需久久为功的综合环境问题短期内无显著作用;地方政府在环境治理中依然存在“保底”倾向。上述结果在考虑了样本偏误、测量指标、环境治理领域等因素后依然稳健。本文的研究发现为通报负面典型案例的生效机制及影响因素提供了可靠的经验支撑,为合理使用通报负面典型案例提供了重要参考。

关键词: 政治势能, 中央环保督察, 通报负面典型案例, 震慑效应

Abstract: Central Ecological and Environmental Protection Inspection is a major institutionally innovative measure for solving the environmental governance dilemma, and notification of negative typical cases is a key part of the measure. On the basis of clarifying the theory of deterrence effect of typical case notification, this paper uses panel data of 282 prefecture level cities from 2014 to 2020 to quantitatively evaluate the deterrence effect of typical case notification and the influencing factors. The results show that typical case notification has a deterrence effect on local governments; stern words in typical case notification strengthen the deterrence effect; directly naming the municipal Party committee and municipal government strengthens the deterrence effect; active public participation and government response magnify the deterrence effect; the deterrence effect is is significant for environmental problems that are easy to solve, but insignificant for comprehensive environmental problems that have to be solved in the long run; local governments still tend to "guarantee the bottom" in environmental governance. The above results remain robust after taking account of sample errors, replacement of measurement indicators, replacement of filed of environmental governance, etc. The findings of this study provide reliable empirical support for the effective mechanism and influencing factors of typical case notification, and provide important reference for further rational use of typical case notification.

Key words: political momentum, Central Environmental Protection Inspection, typical case notification, deterrence effect