管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (9): 274-286.

• 风险与应急管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

政企实物-生产能力应急物资储备与采购定价的微分博弈模型

杨曼1, 刘德海2, 李德龙3   

  1. 1. 东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 大连 116025;
    2. 东北财经大学公共管理学院, 大连 116025;
    3. 内蒙古财经大学工商管理学院, 呼和浩特 010070
  • 收稿日期:2021-11-29 出版日期:2023-09-28 发布日期:2023-10-31
  • 通讯作者: 刘德海(通讯作者),东北财经大学公共管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 作者简介:杨曼,东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院博士研究生;李德龙,内蒙古财经大学工商管理学院讲师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（72274030；71874024；72201051）。

A Differential Game Model of Government and Enterprise Material-Production Capacity Emergency Supplies Reserve and Procurement Pricing

Yang Man1, Liu Dehai2, Li Delong3   

  1. 1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025;
    2. School of Public Administration, Dongbei University of Finance & Economics, Dalian 116025;
    3. School of Business Administration, Inner Mongolia University of Finance & Economics, Hohhot 010070
  • Received:2021-11-29 Online:2023-09-28 Published:2023-10-31

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摘要： 政企实物-生产能力储备应急物资能够有效提高突发事件应对效率。为控制政府成本和保障企业收益，本文构建了政府和企业联合储备应急物资的微分博弈模型，研究成本分担和协同合作两种模式下政企最优储备决策，并进一步分析政府采购定价对政企最优决策与双方收益的影响。最后，结合汶川地震应急物资储备实例进行验证。研究发现，应急物资储备量轨迹随时间呈单调递减特性，声誉轨迹的变化趋势具有多样性，两者在协同合作模式均达到最优。成本分担模式下双方储备努力水平与采购定价呈现倒U型分布，即当政府采购定价低于某一阈值时，企业生产能力储备的合作意愿较高，反之亦然，进而避免企业诱发机会主义行为；而且只有满足一定条件，政府才会为企业提供成本补贴，可避免政府储备成本失控。协同合作模式能够有效降低政府采购成本，提高应急物资储备数量，实现了政企双赢。此外，讨论了若干重要参数对政企最优决策的影响。

关键词: 应急物资储备, 微分博弈, 采购定价, 生产能力储备, 实物储备

Abstract: To control government cost and guarantee enterprise income, this paper constructs a differential game model of government and enterprise joint reserve of emergency materials, and studies the optimal reserve decision of the government and enterprises under two modes of cost sharing and cooperation. Furthermore, it analyzes the influence of government procurement pricing on the optimal decision-making of the government and enterprises and the benefits of both sides. Finally, the case of Wenchuan earthquake emergency material reserve is verified. It is found that the trajectory of the emergency material reserve decreases monotonically with time, the changing trend of reputation trajectory is diversified, and both of them are optimal in the cooperative mode. In the cost-sharing mode, the reserve effort level and procurement pricing of both parties show an inverted U-shaped distribution. That is, when the government procurement pricing is lower than a certain threshold, enterprises have a higher willingness to cooperate in production capacity reserve, and vice versa, thus demotivating enterprises from taking opportunistic actions. And only when certain conditions are met, will the government provide cost subsidies for enterprises, so that the government will not lose control of reserve cost. The cooperative mode can effectively reduce the cost of government procurement, increase the number of emergency supplies, and achieve a win-win situation between the government and enterprises. In addition, the influence of some important parameters on the optimal decision-making of the government and enterprises is discussed.

Key words: emergency supplies reserve, differential game, purchase price, production capacity reserve, physical reserve