高声誉子公司能够抵御母公司利益侵占行为吗?——基于资源依赖理论的视角

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文基于资源依赖理论，以2011—2021年A股上市子公司为样本，研究了子公司声誉对母公司利益侵占行为的影响及子公司董事横向兼任的调节作用。研究发现：子公司声誉对母公司利益侵占具有显著的抑制作用；子公司声誉的两个维度──美誉度与知名度均会对母公司利益侵占行为产生负向影响，但美誉度的治理效应显著强于知名度的治理效应；子公司董事横向兼任增强了子公司声誉与母公司利益侵占行为之间的负相关关系。在拓展性分析中，本文探究了子公司声誉对母公司利益侵占行为的作用机制，发现子公司声誉通过提高股东价值和分析师关注度，进而抑制了母公司利益侵占行为。根据子公司的股权属性和行业特征进行分组并对子公司声誉的治理效应进行检验，发现子公司声誉的治理效应在国有企业和非国有企业之间没有表现出显著性差异；与非高科技行业的样本相比，高科技行业的子公司声誉对母公司利益侵占行为的治理作用更加显著。研究结论丰富了公司声誉在公司治理领域的研究，拓展了资源依赖理论在母子公司情境下的应用，为缓解母公司利益侵占行为，保护中小股东利益提供了经验证据与理论借鉴。

关键词: 公司声誉, 母公司利益侵占行为, 资源依赖理论, 董事横向兼任

Abstract: Based on the perspective of resource dependence theory, using the samples of A-share listed subsidiaries from 2011 to 2021, this paper focuses on the relationship between subsidiary reputation and parent company' expropriation, and the moderating effect of subsidiary director horizontal interlocks. It is found that subsidiary reputation has a significant inhibitory effect on parent company' expropriation. The two dimensions of subsidiary reputation:generalized favorability and being known, both have negative effects on parent company' expropriation, but the governance effect of generalized favorability is significantly stronger than that of being known. The subsidiary director horizontal interlocks strengthen the negative correlation between subsidiary reputation and parent company' expropriation. In an extended research, this paper explores the mechanism of how subsidiary reputation affects parent company' expropriation, and finds that subsidiary reputation inhibits parent company' expropriation by improving shareholder value and analysts' attention. Grouping the ultimate ownership attributes and industry characteristics of subsidiaries, this paper tests the governance effects of subsidiary reputation, and finds that there is no significant difference between the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. Compared with the samples of non-high-tech industries, high-tech subsidiary reputation plays a more significant role in inhabiting parent company' expropriation. This research enriches the research of firm reputation in the field of corporate governance, expands the application of resource dependence theory in the context of parent-subsidiary companies, and provides empirical evidence and theoretical reference for alleviating the effect of parent company' expropriation and protecting the interests of minority shareholders.

Key words: firm reputation, parent company' expropriation, resource dependence theory, director horizontal interlocks

张阳, 徐向艺. 高声誉子公司能够抵御母公司利益侵占行为吗?——基于资源依赖理论的视角[J]. 管理评论, 2023, 35(11): 305-320.

Zhang Yang, Xu Xiangyi. Can a Highly Reputable Subsidiary Resist Its Parent Company' Expropriation?——From the Perspective of Resource Dependence Theory[J]. Management Review, 2023, 35(11): 305-320.

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