管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (10): 222-234.

• 组织与战略管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

“萧规曹随”还是“弃旧图新”:前任CEO离职去向对国有企业战略变革的影响

王凯1,2, 武立东3, 薛佳安4, 薛坤坤5   

  1. 1. 首都经济贸易大学中国 ESG 研究院, 北京 100070;
    2. 首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院, 北京 100070;
    3. 南开大学中国公司治理研究院, 天津 300071;
    4. 北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院, 北京 100875;
    5. 郑州大学商学院, 郑州 450001
  • 收稿日期:2020-04-10 出版日期:2022-10-28 发布日期:2022-11-24
  • 通讯作者: 薛佳安,北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院硕士研究生;薛坤坤,郑州大学商学院讲师,博士。
  • 作者简介:王凯,首都经济贸易大学中国ESG研究院研究员,首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院副教授,博士生导师,博士;武立东,南开大学中国公司治理研究院教授,博士生导师,博士;薛佳安,北京师范大学经济与工商管理学院硕士研究生;薛坤坤,郑州大学商学院讲师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71702114;71972111;71572085);北京市教委科研计划(SM202010038015);首都经济贸易大学青年学术团队项目(QNTD202106)。

‘Following Established Rules’ or ‘Abandoning the Old for the New’: The Impact of Former CEO’s Whereabout on the Strategic Change of a SOE

Wang Kai1,2, Wu Lidong3, Xue Jiaan4, Xue Kunkun5   

  1. 1. Environmental, Social and Governance Institute, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070;
    2. College of Business Administration, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070;
    3. China Academy of Corporate Governance, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071;
    4. Business School, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875;
    5. Business School, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001
  • Received:2020-04-10 Online:2022-10-28 Published:2022-11-24

摘要: 长期以来,行政逻辑在中国国有企业运营实践中起着主导作用。为了揭示嵌入于国有企业中的行政逻辑,现有的理论研究多通过分析国有企业现任CEO的决策如何影响其变更,而没有考虑前任CEO给现任CEO决策所带来的参照效应。在新一阶段国有企业改革的大背景下,本文试图从这一角度验证国有企业中的行政逻辑,同时也为进一步推进国有企业中经济逻辑的主导作用提供依据。在综合制度理论的制度逻辑视角与社会学习理论基础上,本研究聚焦于国有企业CEO变更情境下前任CEO的离职去向如何影响新任CEO的战略选择。以2005—2017年发生过CEO变更的A股国有上市公司为样本,实证研究发现:前任CEO如果获得晋升,新任CEO更倾向于模仿前任CEO的战略决策而不实施变革;而前任CEO如果被降职,新任CEO则倾向于极力规避那些导致前任CEO降职的行为,较大程度地实施战略变革。同时,新任CEO年龄削弱了前任CEO晋升对战略变革的负向影响;环境不确定性加强了前任CEO降职对战略变革的正向影响。进一步研究发现,新任CEO基于前任CEO离职去向而实施的战略变革程度有利于改善企业绩效,说明行政逻辑与经济逻辑同时嵌入在国有企业运营中。此外,前任CEO离职去向对战略变革的影响在新一轮国有企业改革之前更显著,而之后则有所减弱,证明了从行政逻辑向经济逻辑变迁的过程。

关键词: 国有企业, CEO离职去向, 制度逻辑, 社会学习理论, 战略变革

Abstract: For a long time, administrative logic has played a dominant role in the operation of state-owned enterprises in China. The existing researches mostly analyze how the decision of the current CEO of a SOE affects strategic change to reveal the leading role of administrative logic, without considering the reference value that can be gained from former CEO. This paper tries to prove the administrative logic embedded in the operation of SOEs. At the same time, we also try to provide some evidence that economic logic is gradually playing a leading role in the operation of SOEs. Based on the social learning theory from the perspective of institutional logic, this paper focuses on how the new CEO decides whether to follow the strategy of the former CEO according to the former CEO’s whereabout. Using a sample consisting of A-share listed SOEs from 2005 to 2017, we find that, if the former CEO is promoted, the new CEO is more inclined to imitate the strategic decisions of the former CEO without implementing changes, but if the former CEO is demoted, the new CEO tends to avoid the behavior that led to the demotion of the former CEO and implement strategic changes to a greater extent. Meanwhile, the age of new CEO weakens the negative impact of former CEO’s promotion on strategic change. Environmental uncertainty strengthens the positive impact of former CEO’s demotion on strategic change. Further research finds that the degree of strategic change implemented by the new CEO based on the former CEO’s whereabout is conducive to the improvement of corporate performance, indicating that both administrative logic and economic logic are embedded in the operation of SOEs at the same time. In addition, the influence of the former CEO’s whereabout on strategic change is significant before the new round of SOE reform, but less significant after the reform, which is a reflection of the ongoing transition from administrative logic to economic logic.

Key words: SOEs, former CEO’s whereabout, institutional logics, social learning theory, strategic change