横向差异化竞争企业交叉持股背景下概率销售策略研究

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (10): 209-221.

横向差异化竞争企业交叉持股背景下概率销售策略研究

吴一帆¹, 屈雅萍¹, 陈靖²

1. 华东理工大学商学院, 上海 200237;
2. 上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院, 上海 200083

收稿日期:2019-09-04 出版日期:2022-10-28 发布日期:2022-11-24
通讯作者: 陈靖,上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院副教授,博士生导师,博士。
作者简介:吴一帆,华东理工大学商学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;屈雅萍,华东理工大学商学院硕士研究生;陈靖,上海外国语大学国际工商管理学院副教授,博士生导师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71471062;71702106);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(17YJC630010);上海市浦江人才计划(17JPC023);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金。

Effect of Partial Cross Holding between Horizontal Differentiated Competitors on Probabilistic Selling Strategy

Wu Yifan¹, Qu Yaping¹, Chen Jing²

1. School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai 200237;
2. School of Business and Management, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai 200083

Received:2019-09-04 Online:2022-10-28 Published:2022-11-24

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 竞争企业可以通过概率销售策略来实现市场细分和价格歧视,从而减弱竞争以及提高企业的销售利润。交叉持股在很多同行业企业中也普遍存在,企业可以通过交叉持股来加强合作、软化竞争和消除不信任。因此,本文考虑了两个有交叉持股的寡头企业之间的概率销售策略,旨在研究企业采用概率销售策略的动机。本文运用Hotelling模型来表征市场中的竞争企业的特点,构建了一个纳什静态博弈模型,对产品横向差异化市场中的企业间交叉持股模式下的概率销售策略进行研究。结果表明,在对称交叉持股情形下,当边际成本较高时,竞争企业将采用概率销售策略;在不对称交叉持股情形下,当边际成本较小时,引入概率销售策略总能使持股多的企业获益,并且当持股少的企业的被持股量大于一个阈值时,它也可以通过概率销售策略获益。

关键词: 概率销售, 交叉持股, Hotelling模型, 竞争

Abstract: Competing companies can achieve market segmentation and price discrimination through probabilistic selling strategy, thereby reducing competition and increasing sales profits. Cross holding is also popular among many companies of the same industry. Competitors can strengthen cooperation, soften competition and eliminate mistrust through cross holding. Therefore, this paper studies the probabilistic selling strategy between two oligopolistic firms that hold each other’s shares, aiming to find out the motivations behind their probabilistic selling strategy. This paper uses the Hotelling model to depict the characteristics of competing enterprises in the market and constructs a Nash static game model to study the probabilistic selling strategy of cross-holding companies in the products’ horizontally differentiated market. The results show that in the case of asymmetric cross holding, when the marginal cost is small, probabilistic selling strategy always benefits large-holding companies, but small-holding companies whose shares held by others exceed a threshold can also benefit from the probabilistic selling strategy.

Key words: probabilistic selling, cross holding, Hotelling model, competition

吴一帆, 屈雅萍, 陈靖. 横向差异化竞争企业交叉持股背景下概率销售策略研究[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(10): 209-221.

Wu Yifan, Qu Yaping, Chen Jing. Effect of Partial Cross Holding between Horizontal Differentiated Competitors on Probabilistic Selling Strategy[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(10): 209-221.

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