薪酬、股权与晋升,哪种高管激励模式对科研组织衍生企业更有效?——来自我国上市公司的证据

摘要/Abstract

摘要： （中国科学院大学经济与管理学院，北京100190）科研组织衍生企业（academic spin-offs）是科研组织将学术成果转化为生产力而创办的企业。近年来，我国的科研组织衍生企业与日俱增，但经营业绩并不理想。其中，公司治理机制特别是高管激励的有效性一直被认为是影响企业绩效的重要因素。本文以我国境内上市的94家科研组织衍生企业为样本，从不同实际控制人的视角，探讨薪酬激励、股权激励和晋升激励三种高管激励模式对企业综合绩效的影响。结果发现，实际控制人为母体科研组织的衍生企业，其高管激励模式与实际控制人为非母体科研组织的衍生企业显著不同；薪酬激励与晋升激励对科研组织衍生企业综合绩效有显著正向影响，而股权激励的作用不显著。

关键词: 科研组织衍生企业, 高管激励, 企业综合绩效, 实际控制人

Abstract: Establishing academic spin-offs is one of the important means to transfer scientific and technological achievements from academic organizations to industries. In recent years, academic spin-offs arise sharply in China, but their performance is not as satisfactory as expected. Since executive incentive mechanism is a proven key factor for firms’ performance, this paper conducts an empirical study on the relationship between executive incentive modes and corporate comprehensive performance from the perspective of different actual controllers. Based on the samples of 94 academic spin-offs of listed companies in China, the study finds that executive incentive modes are not in common in spin-offs with different actual controllers. Moreover, data shows that pay incentive and promotion incentive have a positive effect on corporate comprehensive performance, while equity incentive does not.

Key words: academic spin-off, executive incentive, corporate comprehensive performance, actual controller

肖建华, 王若凡. 薪酬、股权与晋升,哪种高管激励模式对科研组织衍生企业更有效?——来自我国上市公司的证据[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(1): 79-91.

Xiao Jianhua, Wang Ruofan. Pay, Equity and Promotion, Which Is More Effective Incentive for Executives in Academic Spin-offs?——Evidence from Listed Companies in China[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(1): 79-91.

参考文献

[1] 苏竣,徐磊,眭纪刚. 游离在大学和社会之间:中国大学上市公司研究[J]. 科学学研究, 2014,32(7):1029-1036
[2] 宋希亮,刘晓红,初宜红. 高校系上市公司经营绩效对高校分类改革的启示[J]. 山东社会科学, 2016,26(5):154-161
[3] 江剑,官建成. 我国高校上市公司与大学"产学"合作关系的实证分析[J]. 科学学研究, 2010,28(3):381-387
[4] 张承龙,夏清华. 我国非上市大学衍生企业治理结构与企业绩效间关系的实证分析——基于全国样本[J]. 技术经济, 2012,31(1):1-7
[5] 吴晓求,应展宇. 激励机制与资本结构:理论与中国实证[J]. 管理世界, 2003,(6):5-14
[6] Firth M., Fung P. M. Y., Rui O. M. Corporate Performance and CEO Compensation in China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2006,12(4):0-714
[7] Chen C. J., Hsu C. Y., Chen Y. L. The Impact of Family Control on the Top Management Compensation Mix and Incentive Orientation[J]. International Review of Economics & Finance, 2014,32(Jul.):29-46
[8] 胡玲,黄速建. 中美上市公司高管薪酬差距与公司绩效的比较研究[J]. 经济管理, 2012,34(7):93-102
[9] 赵卫斌,陈志斌. 政府控制与企业高管人员薪酬绩效敏感度[J]. 管理学报, 2012,9(2):267-271
[10] Jensen M. C., Meckling W. H. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3(4):305-360
[11] 何霞. 高管激励、公司治理与绩效关系的理论研究[J]. 科技管理研究, 2013,33(13):173-180
[12] Sloan R. G. Accounting Earnings and Top Executive Compensation[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1993,16(1-3):55-100
[13] Mishra C. S., Mcconaughy D. L., Gobeli D. H. Effectiveness of CEO Pay-for-Performance[J]. Review of Financial Economics, 2000,9(1):1-13
[14] Ozkan N. CEO Compensation and Firm Performance:An Empirical Investigation of UK Panel Data[J]. European Financial Management, 2011,17(2):260-285
[15] 杨青,黄彤. 中国上市公司薪酬存在激励后效吗[J]. 金融研究, 2010,(1):170-189
[16] 刘绍娓,万大艳. 高管薪酬与公司绩效:国有与非国有上市公司的实证比较研究[J]. 中国软科学, 2013,(2):95-106
[17] 陈霞,马连福,丁振松. 国企分类治理、政府控制与高管薪酬激励——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2017,29(3):147-156
[18] 逯东,王运陈,付鹏. 激励提高了内部控制有效性吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J]. 会计研究, 2014,(6):66-72
[19] Kanapathippillai S., Gul F., Mihret D., et al. Compensation Committees, CEO Pay and Firm Performance[J]. Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 2019,57:1-17
[20] Jensen M. C., Murphy K. J. CEO Incentives-Its Not How Much You Pay, But How[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1990,68(3):36-49
[21] Hill M. S., Lopez T. J., Reitenga A. L. CEO Excess Compensation:The Impact of Firm Size and Managerial Power[J]. Advances in Accounting, 2016,33:35-46
[22] 唐松,孙铮. 政治关联、高管薪酬与企业未来经营绩效[J]. 管理世界, 2014,(5):93-105
[23] Cooper M. J., Gulen H., Rau P. R. Performance for Pay? The Relation Between CEO Incentive Compensation and Future Stock Price Performance[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2010,11(1), DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1572085
[24] 李增泉. 激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J]. 会计研究, 2000,(1):24-30
[25] 魏刚. 高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J]. 经济研究, 2000,(3):32-39
[26] Berger P. G., Yermack O. D. L. Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1997,52(4):1411-1438
[27] Certo S. T., Daily C. M., Dalton C. D. R. Giving Money to Get Money:How CEO Stock Options and CEO Equity Enhance IPO Valuations[J]. The Academy of Management Journal, 2003,46(5):643-653
[28] Lilienfeld-Toal U. V., Ruenzi S. CEO Ownership, Stock Market Performance, and Managerial Discretion[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2014,69(3):1013-1050
[29] Collins D., Marquardt B. B., Niu X. Equity-Based Incentives and Shareholder Say-on-Pay[J]. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 2019,46(2):739-761
[30] Agha M. Agency Costs, Executive Incentives and Corporate Financial Decisions[J]. Australian Journal of Management, 2015,41(3):425-456
[31] 姚晓林,刘淑莲,李井林. 股权激励能够为收购公司股东创造价值吗?——基于环境不确定性和大股东控制权性质双重视角[J]. 中国注册会计师, 2017,(7):39-45
[32] Leon L. Is There a Trade-Off between Accrual-Based and Real Earnings Management? Evidence from Equity Compensation and Market Pricing[J]. Finance Research Letters, 2018,28:191-197
[33] Mazouz K., Zhao Y. CEO Incentives,Takeover Protection and Corporate Innovation[J]. British Journal of Management, 2019,30:1-22
[34] Fama E. F., Jensen M. C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1983,26:301-326
[35] DeAngelo L. E. Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes:A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders[J]. The Accounting Review, 1986,41:400-420
[36] Shivdasani A., Zimmerman J. L., Kothari S. P. Board Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers[J]. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 1993,16(1-3):167-198
[37] Hass L. H., Tarsalewska M., Zhan F. Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2016,138(4):723-742
[38] 俞鸿琳. 国有上市公司管理者股权激励效应的实证检验[J]. 经济科学, 2006,(1):108-116
[39] Li M. Y. L., Yang T. H., Yu S. E. CEO Stock-Based Incentive Compensation and Firm Performance:A Quantile Regression Approach[J]. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 2015,26(1):39-71
[40] 范合君,初梓豪. 股权激励对公司绩效倒型影响[J]. 经济与管理研究, 2013,(2):5-11
[41] Cui H., Mak Y. T. The Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance in High R&D Firms[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2002,8(4):313-336
[42] Morck R., Shleifer A., Vishny R. W. Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,20(88):293-315
[43] 刘剑,谈传生. 管理层持股与公司绩效:来自深圳股票市场的经验证据[J]. 中国软科学, 2005,(10):112-119
[44] Lazear E. P., Rosen S. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1981,89(5):841-864
[45] 张洪辉,章琳一. 高管晋升激励与财务舞弊——来自上市公司的经验证据[J]. 经济管理, 2017,39(4):176-194
[46] 罗昆,连燕玲,张璇. 高官"还是"高薪":何种更易留人[J]. 财经研究, 2019,45(2):126-138
[47] 康华,扈文秀,吴祖光,等. 晋升激励、成长性与创业板上市公司研发投入[J]. 科研管理, 2016,37(10):51-59
[48] Lee K. W., Lev B., Yeo G. H. H. Executive Pay Dispersion, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2008,30(3):315-338
[49] 黎文靖,胡玉明. 国企内部薪酬差距激励了谁[J]. 经济研究, 2012,47(12):125-136
[50] 胡秀群. 地区市场化进程下的高管与员工薪酬差距激励效应研究[J]. 管理学报, 2016,13(7):980-988
[51] Xu Y., Liu Y., Lobo G. J. Troubled by Unequal Pay Rather Than Low Pay:The Incentive Effects of a Top Management Team Pay Gap[J]. China Journal of Accounting Research, 2016,9:115-135
[52] Xu M., Kong G., Kong D. Does Wage Justice Hamper Creativity? Pay Gap and Firm Innovation in China[J]. China Economic Review, 2017,44:186-202
[53] Sun L., Habib A., Huang H J. Tournament Incentives and Stock Price Crash Risk:Evidence from China[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2019,54:93-117
[54] 缪毅,胡奕明. 产权性质、薪酬差距与晋升激励[J]. 南开管理评论, 2014,17(4):4-12
[55] Adams J. S. Towards an Understanding of Inequity[J]. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,1963,67(5):422-436
[56] Haß L. H., Müller M. A., Vergauwe S. Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015, 34:251-267
[57] 鲁海帆. 内生性视角下高管层薪酬差距与公司业绩研究[J]. 软科学, 2009,23(12):22-29
[58] 赵睿. 高管-员工薪酬差距与企业绩效——基于中国制造业上市公司面板数据的实证研究[J]. 经济管理, 2012,34(5):96-104
[59] 王永乐,吴继忠. 中华文化背景下薪酬差距对我国企业绩效的影响——兼对锦标赛理论和行为理论适用对象的确认[J]. 当代财经, 2010,(9):59-64
[60] Visintin F., Pittino D. Founding Team Composition and Early Performance of University-Based Spin-Off Companies[J]. Technovation, 2014,34(1):31-43
[61] 杨典. 公司治理与企业绩效——基于中国经验的社会学分析[J]. 中国社会科学, 2013,(1):72-94