集团内部资本交易、市场依赖性与子公司创新

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (8): 104-115.

集团内部资本交易、市场依赖性与子公司创新

郑丽¹, 陈志军², 徐英杰³

1. 青岛大学商学院, 青岛 266071;
2. 山东大学管理学院, 济南 250100;
3. 济南大学商学院, 济南 250100

收稿日期:2018-07-06 出版日期:2021-08-28 发布日期:2021-09-04
作者简介:郑丽,青岛大学商学院副教授,博士;陈志军,山东大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;徐英杰,济南大学商学院讲师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（71672102）；国家社会科学基金项目（18CJY004）；山东省社会科学规划项目（18BSJJ14）。

Internal Capital Transaction, Market Dependence and Subsidiary Innovation

Zheng Li¹, Chen Zhijun², Xu Yingjie³

1. School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071;
2. School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100;
3. School of Business, Jinan University, Jinan 250100

Received:2018-07-06 Online:2021-08-28 Published:2021-09-04

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于内部资本市场有效性和无效性两种截然不同的观点，运用信息不对称性研究集团内部资本交易能否提高子公司竞争优势。以2009—2017年A股上市公司为样本，实证分析发现：集团内部资本交易倒U型影响子公司创新；对内部资本市场依赖性不利于培养子公司创新能力，削弱了资本交易与创新的倒U型关系；对外部资本市场依赖性提高了子公司创新能力，弱化了内部资本交易对创新的倒U型影响。进一步分析发现：国有企业集团子公司对内部资本市场依赖性不利于提高创新能力，民营企业集团子公司可以依赖两种资本市场提高创新绩效。

关键词: 资本交易, 市场依赖性, 企业集团, 公司创新

Abstract: How does internal capital transaction impact subsidiaries' competition advantage? Based on the conflicts of internal capital market availability and unavailability, we employ the perspective of information asymmetry to study the relationship between internal capital transaction and subsidiary innovation. Using the samples of listed subsidiaries from 2009 to 2017, the empirical results show that:the internal capital transaction has an inverted U-shaped effect on subsidiary innovation; the dependence on internal capital market is adverse to fostering innovation capability of subsidiaries, and weakens the internal capital transaction-subsidiary innovation linkages; the dependence on external capital market is benefit to subsidiary innovation, and also weakens the inverted U-shaped relationship between internal capital transaction and subsidiary innovation. Further study shows that dependence of SOE' subsidiaries on internal capital market is adverse to fostering innovation capability, but subsidiaries of private business groups can depend on both internal and external capital markets to improve innovation performance.

Key words: capital transaction, market dependence, business groups, corporate innovation

郑丽, 陈志军, 徐英杰. 集团内部资本交易、市场依赖性与子公司创新[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(8): 104-115.

Zheng Li, Chen Zhijun, Xu Yingjie. Internal Capital Transaction, Market Dependence and Subsidiary Innovation[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(8): 104-115.

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