董事会失败容忍会影响企业创新吗?

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于失败容忍这一全新理论视角，本文将高管薪酬存在黏性与否视为董事会是否容忍高管团队经营决策出现失败的标志性事件，采用总经理薪酬黏性、薪酬最高的前三位高管薪酬黏性两个指标对董事会失败容忍程度进行高管个体和高管团队两个维度的测度。在此基础上，以2008—2016年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本，运用面板数据分析模型和倾向匹配得分模型（PSM）实证检验董事会失败容忍对企业研发投入的影响，并运用最新的interflex分析方法进一步探究上述影响效应在不同产权性质、技术类型和市场化程度下的异质性情况。本文的研究结果表明：（1）董事会失败容忍对企业创新投入具有显著的正向影响，提高董事会失败容忍程度有利于激励企业高管进行更多研发创新投资；（2）相对于国有企业和高新技术企业而言，董事会失败容忍对非国有企业和非高新技术企业研发投入的正向促进效应更强；（3）企业所在地省份的市场化程度越低，董事会失败容忍的创新激励效应会越强。本文研究发现为Manso（2011）等文献提出的失败容忍理论增添了中国资本市场的新经验证据，对转型期中国企业基于创新激励考量设计高管容错机制具有重要的理论参考价值。

关键词: 失败容忍, 企业创新, 产权性质, 技术类型, 市场化程度

Abstract: Based on the new theoretical perspective of failure tolerance, the executive compensation stickiness is considered as a hallmark of the board's ability to tolerate failures of executive team management decisions. In this paper, the compensation stickiness of CEO and the top three executives with the highest salary are used to measure the degree of failure tolerance of the board of directors in both individual and team directions. And then, the Panel Data Analysis Model, Propensity Matching Score Model (PSM) and interflex analysis method are comprehensively used to examine the impact of failure tolerance on corporate's R&D investment, as well as the heterogeneity of the above-mentioned impact effects under different property rights, technology types, and marketization levels within data collated from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China during 2008 to 2016. The results show that:(1) The failure tolerance of the board of directors has a significant positive impact on the innovation investment of the company, namely, when the board of directors is more tolerant of failure, the senior executives of the company tend to carry out more researches and innovation investments. (2) Compared with state-owned enterprises and high-tech enterprises, the failure tolerance of the board of directors has a stronger positive effect on the R&D investment of non-state-owned enterprises and non-high-tech enterprises. (3) The lower the degree of marketization in the province where the company is located, the stronger the incentive effect of innovation in failure tolerance of board of directors. The findings of this research not only add a new empirical evidence form China's capital market for the failure tolerance theory proposed by Manso (2011), but also have important theoretical implications for building and perfecting the fault-tolerant mechanism of senior executives in consideration of innovation incentives for Chinese enterprises in transitional period.

Key words: failure tolerance, corporate innovation, property rights, technology types, marketization degree

陈修德, 栗辉杨, 马文聪, 吴小满. 董事会失败容忍会影响企业创新吗?[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(8): 90-103.

Chen Xiude, Li Huiyang, Ma Wencong, Wu Xiaoman. Does Failure Tolerance of the Board of Directors Affect Corporate Innovation?[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(8): 90-103.

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