管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (10): 313-324.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

考虑需求交叉弹性的多对一型供应链中制造商联盟定价决策问题

潘林1, 马士华2, 冷凯君1, 初叶萍1   

  1. 1. 湖北经济学院工商管理学院/湖北物流发展研究中心, 武汉 430205;
    2. 华中科技大学管理学院, 武汉 430205
  • 收稿日期:2019-05-20 出版日期:2021-10-28 发布日期:2021-11-29
  • 通讯作者: 冷凯君(通讯作者),湖北经济学院工商管理学院教授,博士
  • 作者简介:潘林,湖北经济学院工商管理学院讲师,博士;马士华,华中科技大学管理学院教授,博士生导师;初叶萍,湖北经济学院工商管理学院教授,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目（71472069）；湖北省教育厅科研计划项目（Q20192204；19Q146）；湖北经济学院校级青年科学基金项目（XJ201703；XJ16BS26）；湖北省物流发展研究中心资助项目（19T02）；教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目（20YJC630109）。

Manufacturer Optimal Alliance Pricing Decision in Many to One Supply Chain with Cross Elasticity of Demand Taken into Account

Pan Lin1, Ma Shihua2, Leng Kaijun1, Chu Yeping1   

  1. 1. Hubei Logistics Development Research Center, Hubei University Of Economics, Wuhan 430205;
    2. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430205
  • Received:2019-05-20 Online:2021-10-28 Published:2021-11-29

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摘要： 以两个差异化制造商和一个共同零售商组成的多对一型供应链系统为对象，从需求交叉弹性视角，探讨多对一型供应链中制造商联盟定价决策问题。研究表明：对于制造商而言，在互补型供应链中，当负向需求交叉弹性效应较低时，纵向联盟定价是占优策略；反之，集中联盟定价是占优策略，且均能实现帕累托改进。在竞争型供应链中，当正向需求交叉弹性效应较低时，集中联盟定价是占优策略；反之，横向联盟定价是占优策略，但零售商与消费者利益均将受到损害，难以实现帕累托改进。

关键词: 多对一型供应链, 需求交叉弹性, 联盟定价决策, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: This paper explores the cooperative pricing decisions problem for two related products in a two-echelon supply chain that consists of two manufacturers and one common retailer from the perspective of cross elasticity of demand. The results indicate that:for manufacturers, in the complementary supply chain, the vertical alliance pricing is the optimal strategy when the cross elasticity effect of negative demand is low; otherwise, the centralized alliance pricing is the dominant strategy. These two strategies both can achieve Pareto improvement. In the competitive supply chain, the centralized alliance pricing is an optimal strategy when the cross elasticity effect of positive demand is low; otherwise, the horizontal alliance pricing is the dominant strategy, but both retailers and consumers' profit will suffer, the Pareto improvement cannot be obtained.

Key words: many to one supply chain, cross elasticity of demand, alliance pricing decision, Stackelberg game