管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (10): 297-312.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

新零售模式下制造商渠道入侵的供应链定价研究

李秋香1,2, 邓清2, 黄毅敏3   

  1. 1. 河南大学管理科学与工程研究所, 开封 475004;
    2. 河南大学商学院, 开封 475004;
    3. 华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院, 郑州 450046
  • 收稿日期:2020-09-23 出版日期:2021-10-28 发布日期:2021-11-29
  • 通讯作者: 黄毅敏(通讯作者),华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士
  • 作者简介:李秋香,河南大学商学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;邓清,河南大学商学院硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目（19FGLB067；20FGLB050）；河南省科技发展计划软科学项目（192400410088）。

Research on Supply Chain Pricing of Manufacturer Channel Invasion under New Retail Model

Li Qiuxiang1,2, Deng Qing2, Huang Yimin3   

  1. 1. Institute of Management Science and Engineering, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
    2. Business School, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
    3. School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Hydropower, Zhengzhou 450046
  • Received:2020-09-23 Online:2021-10-28 Published:2021-11-29

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摘要： 从新零售视角出发，构建由制造商和体验店形成的新零售销售渠道。研究新零售渠道入侵前后的两阶段供应链演化模型，分别在分散决策和集中决策模型下对比了决策者的最优价格，并分析在渠道入侵前后各变量对渠道定价和参与者利润的影响。研究发现：（1）渠道入侵后的分散和集中决策模型下，随着新零售渠道偏好率的增加，新零售价格增加，传统零售价格下降，网络直销价格可能增加也可能下降。（2）无论是渠道入侵前还是渠道入侵后，集中决策下的供应链利润总是高于分散决策下的利润。（3）新零售渠道偏好率的增长会增加制造商利润，同时减少零售商利润，因此新零售渠道偏好率会增强制造商渠道入侵动机。最后通过数值分析发现一定条件下渠道入侵可以增加制造商和零售商的利润，从而实现帕累托优化，对供应链系统是有利的。

关键词: 新零售, 渠道入侵, 定价, 渠道偏好率, 帕累托优化

Abstract: From the perspective of new retail, this paper constructs a new retail sale channel that consists of manufacturer and experience store, and studies the supply chain evolution model before and after the invasion of new retail channel. The optimal prices under decentralized decision and centralized decision models are compared, and the impact of various variables on channel pricing and participant profits before and after the channel invasion is analyzed. The results show that:(1) Under the decentralized and centralized decision models after channel invasion, with the increase of new retail channel preference rate, the new retail price increases, the traditional retail price decreases, and the online direct selling price may increase or decrease. (2) No matter whether before or after channel invasion, the profit of supply chain under centralized decision is always higher than that under decentralized decision. (3) The increase of new retail channel preference rate will increase manufacturer's profit and decrease retailer's profit, so new retail channel preference rate will enhance manufacturer's channel invasion motivation. Finally, a numerical analysis shows that under certain conditions, channel intrusion can increase the profit of manufacturer and retailer, and then realize Pareto improvement, which is beneficial to the supply chain system.

Key words: new retail, channel invasion, pricing, channel preference, Pareto improvement