关键词: 供应链金融, 利率市场化, 交易策略, 质押率

Abstract:

Whether the interest rate marketization has a direct impact on the capital structure and operational decisions of SMEs with financing difficulties in the supply chain finance is an important subject of current researches. From the perspective of supply chain finance, this paper constructs a three-dimension game model involving suppliers, retailers and banks in the context of interest rate marketization, and explores how to achieve optimal strategies for the parties involved in financing business to achieve their respective interests, especially how to conduct risk control and determine the optimal self-loan interest rate. By establishing a single-cycle newsboy model, this paper reveals the decision-making linkage relationship among the parties involved in the market transaction, and firstly it is found that the retailers who are in a decision-making disadvantage in the financing business can achieve the sub-optimal order under the participation constraint. Secondly, by analyzing the expected return and loss limit of the supplier and the risk attitude of the bank, the optimal wholesale price of the supplier in the transaction contract and the value range of the bank's pledge rate and the optimal independent interest rate decision are determined. Finally, the numerical simulation compares the decision results of whether the interest rate is marketized. The research shows that supply chain finance can improve supply chain performance, interest rate policy will have a direct impact on supply chain performance, but interest rate marketization cannot completely solve the structural problems of SME financing difficulties.

Key words: supply chain finance, interest rate liberalization, trading strategies, impawn rate