管理评论

›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2): 278-286.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

存在线下体验店的O2O供应链佣金契约设计

张旭梅1, 金亮2   

  1. 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044;
    2. 南昌大学经济管理学院, 南昌 330031
  • 收稿日期:2017-05-15 出版日期:2020-02-29 发布日期:2020-03-07
  • 通讯作者: 张旭梅(通讯作者),重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士
  • 作者简介:金亮,南昌大学经济管理学院讲师,博士。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目（71572020）；中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目（2017CDJSK02PT0）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（19YJC630067）。

Design of Commission Contract in Offline to Online Supply Chain in the Presence of Showroom

Zhang Xumei1, Jin Liang2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031
  • Received:2017-05-15 Online:2020-02-29 Published:2020-03-07

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摘要：

研究了由一个线下体验店和一个线上零售商构成的线下到线上O2O供应链佣金契约设计问题。考虑消费者对于线上零售商产品是否符合其需求不确定以及可能发生的退货行为，建立了线上零售商与线下体验店之间的委托代理模型，求解得到了体验服务努力水平可观测和不可观测情形下的最优佣金契约，并据此分析了退货率、消费者退货成本等因素对佣金契约参数的影响。研究结果表明，最优佣金契约中的佣金率与固定支付对线下体验店具有不同的激励作用；与体验服务努力水平可观测情形相比，体验服务努力水平不可观测导致线上零售商利润下降，但当消费者直接线上购买概率较高或退货率较高时，努力水平不可观测给线上零售商带来的利润损失将得到有效缓解。

关键词: O2O供应链, 线下体验店, 线上零售商, 佣金契约

Abstract:

This paper explores commission contract design in an offline to online (O2O) supply chain where an online retailer sells a product and an offline showroom provides experience service to consumers. Considering that consumers are uncertain about whether the product sold by online retailer fits their needs, we establish a principal-agent model between the online retailer and the offline showroom. Then we design the optimal commission contracts in two scenarios where offline experience service effort is observable and is unobservable to the online retailer, respectively. Further, the impact of return rate and consumers' return cost on the equilibrium results is analyzed. The results show that commission rate and fixed payment of the optimal commission contracts have different incentives to the offline showroom. Compared with the observable scenario of the offline experience service effort, the unobservability of the offline experience service effort leads to the decline of the online retailer's profit; but when consumers have higher probability to purchase through the online retailer or the return rate is higher, the profit loss of the online retailer which caused by the unobservability of the offline experience service effort will decrease effectively.

Key words: O2O supply chain, showroom, online retailer, commission contract