CEO和董事之间的“本家关系”增加了代理成本?

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文以2000-2016年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本，实证研究了CEO和董事之间的"本家关系"（姓氏层面关系）对企业代理成本的影响。研究发现：这种"本家关系"会显著增加企业的代理成本。在控制了内生性之后，这种正向影响仍然显著存在。进一步研究发现：（1）"本家关系"在非国企中的影响更明显；（2）非常见姓氏的"本家关系"、姓氏观念强地区中的"本家关系"对代理成本的影响更明显；（3）"本家关系"对较弱法律环境中的企业的影响更明显；（4）"本家关系"对人口净流入地区中的企业的影响更明显。影响路径的检验发现，"本家关系"对代理成本的影响通过降低董事独立性和提升信息不对称的严重程度得以实现。研究结论表明，为了进一步加强公司治理水平，利益相关者需要重视企业中内部关系文化等软性因素的影响，文章补充和丰富了"文化与金融"的微观研究。

关键词: 关系文化, 信任, 沟通成本, 代理成本

Abstract:

In this paper, we analyze the relation between surname relationship of CEOs and directors and agency cost. We find that the above surname relationship is positively and significantly related to agency cost. Our main findings are robust to a battery of robustness tests. The positive effect is more pronounced when (1) firms are non-state-owned enterprises, (2) CEOs and directors share rare surnames, (3) firms located in the district with strong sense of surname or with a weak legal environment or with net population inflow. In addition, it also suggests that surname relationship increases agency cost by reducing board independence and increasing the severity of information asymmetry. Collectively, we contribute to the understanding of surname-based social affinity by providing the first piece of evidence on the effect of surname sharing on agency cost.

Key words: relationship culture, trust, communication cost, agency cost

闫伟宸,肖星. CEO和董事之间的“本家关系”增加了代理成本?[J]. , 2019, 31(4): 99-116.

Yan Weichen, Xiao Xing. Does Surname Relationship Between CEOs and Directors Affect Agency Cost?[J]. , 2019, 31(4): 99-116.

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