高管激励影响公司环境污染行为吗?

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文从内部治理和高管激励角度出发,探讨如何有效地将相对绩效考评方式与高管政治激励和薪酬激励方式相结合以治理公司环境污染行为.本研究通过系统整理收集2004-2012年度我国重污染行业上市公司环境污染行为的相关数据,融合前景理论,实证研究发现基于社会绩效的评价方式能够降低高管采取公司环境污染行为的动力,表现为高社会相对绩效的公司不倾向于污染环境,尤其是高管还具有政治关联的公司.然而,基于历史绩效的评价方式却激励高管采取公司环境污染行为,表现为:一方面高历史相对绩效的公司倾向于污染环境,但是给予高管高额的固定报酬可以起到削弱高历史相对绩效情况下高管采取公司环境污染行为的倾向;另一方面,低历史相对绩效与高管高额的固定报酬相结合又会促使高管采取公司环境污染行为.研究结果表明强化基于社会相对绩效的绩效评价方式,鼓励基于高管政治激励和在高的历史相对绩效情况下给予高管高额的固定薪酬能够起到激励高管规制公司污染环境行为的作用.

关键词: 环境污染, 绩效评价, 高管激励, 政治关联, 行为理论

Abstract:

We turn to the internal governance from the aspect of incentive on top managers to regulate corporate pollution practices. We explore how to incorporate the corporate relative performance evaluation with the incentive on top managers to regulate corporate environmental pollution. We collect data of environmental pollution practices of Chinese environmental-intensity industrial listed firms from 2004 to 2012. Applying the prospect theory, we find that corporate social relative performance is beneficial for reducing the corporate pollution, and specifically for those firms in which the top managers have political affiliations. However, corporate historical relative performance may deteriorate the corporate pollution. For details, on the one hand, there is a positive relationship between high historical relative performance and the likelihood of corporate environmental pollution, but fixed payment of top managers mitigates this relationship. On the other hand, although there is a negative relationship between the low historical relative performance and corporate environmental pollution, a high fixed payment of top managers still promote corporate practices of environmental pollution. The results indicate that introduction of the corporate social relative performance evaluation and assigning political incentive on top managers as well as signing high fixed payment of top managers when a corporation having a high historical relative performance would sufficiently forestall the propensity of corporate environmental pollutions.

Key words: environmental pollution, performance evaluation, managerial incentive, political affiliation, behavior theory

贾明, 童立, 张喆. 高管激励影响公司环境污染行为吗?[J]. , 2016, 28(2): 149-165,174.

Jia Ming, Tong Li, Zhang Zhe. Does Incentive on Top Managers Influence Corporate Pollution Practices?[J]. , 2016, 28(2): 149-165,174.

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