独立董事政治关联对企业信贷融资的影响研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为探究政治关系背景独董的资源获取效应及其作用边界，本研究以2010-2012年沪深A股上市公司为样本，分析并检验了独立董事政治关联对银行信贷的影响以及企业产权性质和高管政治关联对独董政治关联贷款效应的调节作用。研究结果表明，独董政治关联能够增强企业进行银行信贷的能力；此外，贷款效应会受到国有产权性质和高管政治关联的影响，即国有产权性质对独董政治关联的贷款效应有削弱作用，高管政治关联对独董政治关联的贷款效应有增强作用；国有产权性质会削弱高管政治关联对独董政治关联贷款效应的调节作用。研究结论对完善上市公司独董选聘机制以及信贷资源配置的市场化改革提供了参考借鉴。

关键词: 独立董事, 政治关联, 产权性质, 银行信贷

Abstract:

Using the A-share listed companies during the period of 2010-2012 as sample, we analyze and test the effect of independent directors' political connection on bank credit and the moderating role of the nature of property rights and senior managers' political con-nection on the relationship between independent directors' political connection and bank credit. The results show that political connection of independent directors is significantly positively associated with bank credit. Furthermore, the credit effect is affected by the nature of state-owned property and senior managers' political connection. Specifically, the nature of state-owned property weakens the credit effect of independent directors' political connection, and senior managers' political connection strengthens the effect. Moreover, the nature of state-owned property weakens the role of senior managers' political connection on the credit effect of political connection of independent directors.

Key words: independent directors, political connection, nature of property rights, bank credit

黄珺, 魏莎. 独立董事政治关联对企业信贷融资的影响研究[J]. , 2016, 28(11): 182-190.

Huang Jun, Wei Sha. The Effect of Independent Directors' Political Connection on Bank Credit[J]. , 2016, 28(11): 182-190.

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