›› 2017, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (5): 192-204.

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The Condition and Strategy of Media Participating in Food Safety Social Co-governance

Xie Kang, Liu Yi, Zhao Xin   

  1. Business School, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275
  • Received:2016-11-28 Online:2017-05-28 Published:2017-05-26

Abstract:

The existing literature often starts from the rational behavior assumption to discuss the value of media participating in the food safety governance, but seldom discusses the condition and strategy media participating in food safety. This paper develops a dynamic game theory model of media and food safety firm based on the bounded rational behavior assumption. Result shows that the condition of media participating in food safety social co-governance includes three parts:the level of reputation sensitivity of food firm, the judge of media and the punishment of government regulation. As a result, the strategy of media participating in food safety social co-governance is as follows:(1) The social reputation of media is the condition of media participating in co-governance, so that government can use other methods to maintain the social reputation institution; (2) The style of media reporting food safety violation behavior should be constant and deep, rather than just transient. (3) Both traditional media and new media should participate in food safety social co-governance, so that media can deter the violation of food safety; (4) Government should develop a media supervision system so that media participation can become legal and more qualified reporters would participate in this area.

Key words: food safety, social co-governance, media participation, reputation institution, institutional arrangement