Political Connections, Financial Development and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy——From the Perspective of Chinese Private Listed Companies' Bank Loans

Abstract

Abstract:

This paperdraws upon A share listed private companies during 2006~2011 to study the political connections and the level of financial development impact on the availability of their bank loans in different periods of monetary policy, in order to make it clear from the micro perspective whether the credit transmission channel of monetary policy is blocked and valid, and then provide some ideas for solving the "credit discrimination" problem faced by Chinese private companies. The study finds that the political connections, the level of financial development and their interaction have different effects on the effectiveness of monetary policy. To be specific:(1) the level of financial development could affect the effect of tightening monetary policy on the term of the loan, but not the effect on the total amount of bank loans; (2) the effect of tightening monetary policy on amounts and term of bank loans, are affected by political connections; and (3) interaction term of financial development and political connections can affect the validity of monetary policy to the amount of bank loans, but the validity impact of monetary policy on the term of bank loans is not affected.

Key words: private listed companies, political connections, financial development, monetary policy, bank loans

Wang Wei. Political Connections, Financial Development and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy——From the Perspective of Chinese Private Listed Companies' Bank Loans[J]. , 2016, 28(6): 52-64.

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