Optimal Decisions of Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on the Government Fund

Abstract

Abstract:

Aimed at remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a single manufacture, remanufacturer and retailer based on the government fund, this paper constructs decentralized decision making CLSC models with or without the government fund, respectively, and discusses the impact of the environmental tax as well as recycling subsidies on the decision and profits of the CLSC models. The research shows that with the government fund, the market demand for remanufactured product, the amount of waste products recycled, and the remanufacturer's profit, all of them will be on the increase. Thus, the government fund policy can achieve the goal of promoting the waste product remanufacturing effectively. The market demand for new product and the manufacture's profit both decrease, guiding manufacturers participate in the process of recycling and remanufacturing. The rise or fall in product price, and the variation of profits in supply chain system or on retail, are related to the relative ratio between environmental tax and recycling subsidies. That is, the government can regulate the interests of customers, supply chain system and retailers by setting a reasonable ratio. Conclusions above are proved by the numerical analysis.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, the government fund, optimal decision, recycling and remanufacturing

Li Xinran, Chen Rong. Optimal Decisions of Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain Based on the Government Fund[J]. , 2015, 27(10): 183-194.

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