Management Review ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (5): 17-29.

• Economic and Financial Management • Previous Articles    

Has the Urban Agglomeration Policy Eased Competition for Industrial Land Prices? -Empirical Evidence from 19 Urban Agglomerations in China

Huang Zhiji1,2, Shi Tao3,4, He Canfei5   

  1. 1. School of Government, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081;
    2. Hangzhou International Urbanology Research Center (Center for Urban Governance Studies), Hangzhou 311121;
    3. School of Urban Planning and Design, Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School, Shenzhen 518055;
    4. Social Laboratory of Urban Spatial Governance and Policy Simulation, Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School, Shenzhen 518055;
    5. School of Urban and Environmental Sciences, Peking University, Beijing 100871
  • Received:2022-02-25 Published:2025-06-18

Abstract: Price competition for industrial land transfers is a typical feature of horizontal competition among local governments in China. The implementation of the urban agglomerations' development strategy has adjusted the competitive incentives of local governments at the cross-administrative level and reshaped their industrial land granting behavior. This paper investigates the impact of urban agglomeration approvals on industrial land price competition using panel data from 2007 to 2020 for 281 prefecture-level and above cities across China. The results are as follows. (1) Benchmark regressions find that urban agglomeration approvals mitigate industrial land grant price competition among local governments under the geographic proximity setting, and the estimation results remain robust after changing the proxy variables, urban agglomeration approval time, and spatial weight matrix. (2) The path analysis finds that the administrative and market dividends generated by the urban agglomeration approvals can be manifested as a significant increase in the entropy of manufacturing locations and the share of industrial enterprises in the urban agglomeration and a reduction in the willingness of local governments to engage in land price competition. (3) Expanded analysis reveals that the conditions for industrial land price competition among cities with similar economic development are the existence of geographical proximity or the same provincial administrative division; at the same time, urban agglomeration approvals have the greatest effect on mitigating industrial land price competition among cities with similar economic development in the province. This paper argues that centralizing the authority of urban cluster granting in the central government is an important policy tool to reasonably regulate the incentives of competition and cooperation among local governments.

Key words: urban agglomeration, industrial land price competition, two-regime spatial panel Durbin model